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Abstract 
 
This paper empirically examines the functional role of various micro and macro economic as 
well as situational factors that determine residential housing demand and risk of borrower 
default. Using 13,487 housing loan accounts (sanctioned from 1993-2007) data from 
Housing Finance Institutions (HFIs) in India, we investigate the crucial factors that drive 
demand for housing and its correlation with borrower characteristics. Next, we examine 
housing loan defaults and the major causative factors of the same. Our empirical results 
suggest that borrower defaults on housing loan payments is mainly driven by change in 
market value of the property vis-à-vis the loan amount and EMI to income ratio. A 10 
percent decrease in the market value of the property vis-à-vis the loan amount raises the odds 
of default by 1.55 percent. Similarly, a 10 percent increase in EMI to income ratio raises the 
delinquency chance by 4.50 percent.  However, one cannot ignore borrower characteristics 
like marital status, employment situation, regional locations, city locations, age profile and 
house preference which otherwise may inhibit lender to properly assess credit risk in home 
loan business as our results show that these parameters also act as default triggers.   
 
 
 
Keywords: Housing Demand, Risk Management, Financial Institutions and Banks 
 
JEL Classification Number: R21, G32, G2 
 
 
 
* Address for correspondence: Arindam Bandyopadhyay, Associate Professor (Finance), National 
Institute of Bank Management (NIBM), Kondhwe Khurd, Pune-411048, India. Phone: 0091-20-
26716451. E-mail addresses:arindb@rediffmail.com, arindam@nibmindia.org. 
 1 
 
1. Introduction 
The growth in disposable income, demographic changes such as a growing number of 
working women who spend more, the growing number of nuclear families, higher income 
levels within the urban population, the access and availability of bank finance are driving the 
housing demand in India. The housing construction sector is therefore becoming one of the 
most important sectors of the Indian economy and has tremendous potential to become more 
and more important in the coming years. However, housing finance companies and banks 
need to more carefully evaluate the underlying risk of default. Aggressive lending by banks 
in a soft interest rate environment during early part of the present decade with corresponding 
sharp growth in hosing construction led to a major supply-demand mismatch in the 
residential housing market in US. Less than proportionate growth in household income, 
hardening of the interest rate environment and reduced liquidity in the subsequent period led 
to a precipitous fall in the market value of the housing stock. The dramatic drop in the 
residential property rates in many parts of the US is being attributed in the literature to the 
ongoing ‘sub-prime crisis’. It is in this sense essential to understand the basic demand drivers 
in this market and how they are linked to the default risk of housing loans. The sharp fall in 
property prices following the Asian financial crisis (June 1997-December 1998) has led 
many residential mortgage holders in Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan to experience negative 
equity which had caused sharp increase in non performing assets (NPAs) and severe loan 
losses. 
Banks in India have been playing an important role in providing credit to the housing 
sector and thereby contributing to the aggregate demand in the sector. Moreover, Indian 
banks also extend various types of loans against residential housing properties. Housing loan 
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now constitutes more than 25 percent of the lending portfolios of individual banks. While 
evaluating the loan proposal, banks look at both qualitative and quantitative factors to 
evaluate the credit worthiness of their customers. Profiling of customers and idea of their 
changing preference and demand projections would help banks to better understand the 
market. It is also pertinent to mention at this stage that rapid growth in mortgage credit and 
house prices has given way to heightened concerns about housing loan defaults.  Rapid 
expansion of credit increases the possibility of relaxation of income criteria/lending standards 
for those applying for loans or lending to those whose income stream is not guaranteed or 
secure. Variation in standards across the industry imposes systemic risks which can be a 
potential threat to the sector. As identified by Ellis (2008, BIS paper), the US mortgage 
system had previously tended to lend at more conservative (Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004)), 
however, at later phase, LTV ratios on new mortgages increased substantially, and explicit 
100 percent financing became much common. This easing of lending norms is one of the 
major driver of observed increase in early payment defaults in the United States (Kiff and 
Mills 2007; Gerardi, Lehnert, Sherlund and Willen, 2008). Ellis (2008) has shown that 
lending standards declined more in areas that experienced larger credit booms and house 
price increases. 
Recent US mortgage crisis, which has virtually crippled the health of the financial 
system, sends a clear signal that due-diligence in lending should continue to be the corner 
stone of sound banking practices. It has further revealed the vulnerability of the financial 
institutions due to interaction between falling housing prices and homeowners’ home equity 
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lines of credit.1 As housing prices have risen over the course of the current decade, products 
have proliferated that allow consumers to tap into the wealth created by home-price 
appreciation and in the process their mark to market loan to value ratio was steadily 
increasing.  These products became potentially risky during periods of falling home prices 
(Rosengren, 2008). 
The empirical research on housing market in India is scarce due to the paucity of 
relevant data. The main objective of this paper is a) to find the nature of residential housing 
demand at present in India and estimate the major factors that drive the residential housing 
demand, b) to correlate existing profile of housing loan borrowers of select banks and 
housing finance companies to understand the relationship between borrower characteristics 
and loan parameters such as asset quality, delinquencies, period of loans, collateral values 
etc. c) Type of households in the population more prone to default on payments, d) How 
demographic and situational factors such as employment status, family type, income level, 
locations affect risk of default. In doing so, we also examine the linkage between loan 
delinquency and value of collateral to further pinpoint the importance of valuation in the 
housing sector. 
In order to accomplish the above objectives, present study uses individual account 
level loan data from banks and housing finance companies and macroeconomic information 
collected from various secondary sources to examine the determinants of residential housing 
demand and default risk in India. Apart from macroeconomic variables, loan related, 
situational and locational factors are used as explanatory variables. 
                                                 
1
  On a national level, housing prices peaked in early 2005, began declining in 2006 and have not yet 
bottomed. Increased foreclosure rates in 2006–2007 by U.S. homeowners led to a crisis in August 2007 for the 
sub-prime mortgage market. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section discusses the relevant 
literature on housing demand estimation and key risk factors embedded in this market and 
nature of their relationship. The third section gives a macro perspective on the housing 
market condition in India that will enable the reader to assess the market and industry 
attractiveness. The fourth section describes the data, construction of variables and descriptive 
statistics. The fifth section presents the empirical results. Section six discusses the main 
conclusions. Tables and Figures are given at the end of the paper with a list of variables and 
their definitions.  
2. Review of Literature 
Most of empirical studies on estimation of housing demand take price, income and 
demographic parameters either in a log-linear regression or in a two-stage hedonic pricing 
regression method (Rosen, 1974; Brown and Rosen, 1982; Epple, 1987; Bartik, 1987; Bajari 
and Kahn, 2003. Tewari and Parikh (1998 and 1999) have used ridge regressions function 
(log-linear) to estimate housing demand. Bajari and Kahn (2003) estimated the hedonic price 
functions to predict the distribution of taste parameters as a function of demographics. 
Arimah (1992) estimated demand functions for a set of housing attributes for the city of 
Ibadan in Nigeria using a two-step method like Rosen (1974). Their empirical results reveal 
that the most important determinants of the demand attributes are: income, price, household 
size and the occupational status of the head of household. Besides income and wealth, other 
characteristics (sociological or demographic) of the household may influence the difference 
in housing demands. The number of people in the household influences the consumption 
demand positively (more spacious housing). Moreover, the nature of professional activity 
(employee vs. self-employed) and professional status (retired vs. in activity) also can affect 
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housing demand. The stock value of financial information (proxied by age, education, etc.) 
may also explain housing demand. In this paper, we have performed a panel Least Square 
Dummy Variable (LSDV) regression method using 13,487 borrower account data to study 
the effect of income, price, and age on housing demand. In our micro model, we have 
considered natural log of house area (in square meter) as proxy for housing demand. We have 
also captured various location related variables, and studied their influence on demand for 
dwelling units.   
Much of the research on housing loan default has tested the relative importance of 
negative equity (or loan to value ratio) and factors related to the borrowers’ ability to pay as 
determinants of mortgage default. There is empirical evidence to show that variance in 
property value (uncertainty) is related to default risk.  Furstenberg (1974), Morton (1975), 
Ingram and Frazier (1982), Webb (1982), Waller (1988), Canner et al. (1991),  Vandell, 
Barnes, Hartzell, Kraft and Wendt (1993)  and Lawrence and Arshadi (1995) and have found 
that in addition to borrower's personal characteristics, Loan to Value (LTV) ratio at the time 
of origination as well as the income of the borrower play important roles in mortgage 
delinquency. Campbell and Dietrich (1984), Vandell and Thibodeau (1985), Lawrence et al. 
(1992), Mills and Lubuele (1994) and Deng et al. (1995) all concluded that the variable 
"loan-to-value ratio" has made a statistically significant contribution to the determinants of 
mortgage loan default risk and also showed that their relationship is positively correlated. 
Lee (2002) has identified the ‘purpose of purchasing real estate property’ is one of the 
key determinants of default risk. If the borrowers purchase new houses for the purpose of 
personal investment instead of owner-occupied housing, then they will transfer part of their 
risk to the financial institutions by paying smaller down payments and decreasing their initial 
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equity commitment as much as possible. Therefore, when the market price of collateral falls 
sharply or economic performance becomes much worse, the property frequently will be 
abandoned by the owners thereby limiting their loss.  
Getter (2003) complemented these finding by using the 1998 Survey of Consumer 
Finances to show that borrowers use other non-housing financial assets to help make 
payments during unexpected periods of financial stress. Consistent with prior findings, 
Chinloy (1995) found that in the United Kingdom during the period 1983 through 1992, LTV 
and income were the primary covariates associated with delinquency. Other reported studies 
have also found that credit scores, contemporaneous economic conditions, and the incentive 
structure of the lender all can impact delinquency (Baku and Smith 1998, Calem and 
Wachter 1999, Ambrose and Capone 2000). 
Another variable, payment-to-income ratio (or Equated Monthly Installment-EMI- to 
Income ratio), is important in explaining default risk, as confirmed by studies such as 
Stansell and Millar (1976), Vandell (1978) and Ingram and Frazier (1982). They hold the 
belief that the higher the payment-to-income ratio, the larger the default risk. Williams, 
Beranek and Kenkel (1974) have found that once initial payment to income ratio exceeds 30 
percent, borrowers tend to have higher probability of default. 
Follian, Huang, and Ondrich (1999) include in their model tenure, location, 
demographic and economic variables as covariates to explain default. The contingent claim 
approach, which is considered by Kau and Keenan (1998), treats default as a rational 
decision, such that a default occurs if the house value (equity value) falls below the value of 
the mortgage. Lee (2002) has empirically proved that residential foreclosure rates are 
negatively related to local economic diversification. 
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Studies of von Furstenberg and Green (1974), Avery et al (2004) have assessed local 
situational factors as factors of default risk. They find that inclusion of situational factors 
(like unemployment status, marital status, credit history etc.) and other borrower specific 
characters (joint account or single account, age, location of the borrower etc.) improves the 
performance of credit scoring models. Riddiough (1991) has found various trigger events, 
such as divorce, loss of a job, and accident or sudden death has influence on default behavior. 
Eichholtz (1995) has observed the relationship between regional economic stability and 
mortgage default risk in Netherlands.  
3. Housing Market Condition in India: Emerging trends in housing and housing finance  
Given the population growth rate in the Indian economy and the consequential 
requirement for housing stock, the housing construction sector is increasingly becoming one 
of the most important sectors of the Indian economy having tremendous potential to become 
more and more important in coming years. If supply constraints do not get in the way, it has 
the potential to not only satisfy a key requirement, but also would provide impetus to 
economic growth.   
One of the most significant factors that drove the growth of housing market in India 
in the recent years was the ‘easy availability’ of bank finance at ‘affordable interest rates’ 
owing to relatively comfortable liquidity position in the banking system and a soft interest 
rate environment. Housing market in India, as evidenced by the growth in bank exposures to 
the sector took off mainly since the year 2001 (Table 1). The retail loan portfolios of banks 
including housing and real estate advances expanded at rates ranging between 22 to 41 per 
cent since 2001-02 and on an average accounted for 20.5 per cent of the incremental non-
food credit during this period (see Table 2). Housing credit has formed a dominant share of 
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overall non-food credit growth in India during the recent years. The rapid growth in housing 
loan market has been supported, inter-alia, by the growth in the middle class population, 
favourable demographic structure, rising job opportunities in the metropolitan centres, 
emergence of a number of second tier cities as upcoming business centres, boom in the IT 
sector in India and rise in disposable incomes. Furthermore, attractive tax advantages for 
housing loans make them ideal vehicles for tax planning for salary earners.  
[Insert Table 1 & Table 2 here] 
3.1. Prediction of Realizable Demand for Housing through Mapping the Credit Supply 
Projections  
We have made an attempt to project realizable demand for housing through credit 
supply channel till 2012 in Table 3 and Table 4. The first column of table 3 presents the year 
concerned, second column reports number of housing loans disbursed by PSBs during that 
year, 3rd column shows HFCs share in total Housing loan credit supply (in  percent), 4th 
column shows HFCs number of loans disbursed, 5th column captures the total number of 
housing loans. In the 6th column we have tabulated the projected households’ numbers in 
million figures. This annual projection is based on exponential projection of decadal census 
data.  Seventh column represents proportion of loan number to households’ number.  
[Insert Table 3 & Table 4 here] 
The realized demand for housing (in percent) is estimated by dividing the total 
housing loan numbers by the total households population (column 5÷column 7 of the table 
2). If we now multiply this percentage (percent) by the households number in million 
(column 6 figures), we obtain the estimated potential demand for housing (in million). Table 
4 depicts the simulated figures in 3 projected growth scenarios (in terms of per capita 
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growth). These three scenarios are the projected loan number to household number in per 
cent. If percapita loan number increases at a rate of 2.35 percent, 2.50 percent and 3.30 
percent, then the corresponding number of projected housing demand in units will be 5.82, 
6.19 and 7.43 million respectively in 2012.  
3.2. Growth profile in Indian housing market and probable causes of concern 
There seems to be quite strong association between the economic growth vis-à-vis the 
loan outstanding (See Figure 1). This is further corroborated by the fact that when there is a 
downward spiral in the economy, loan outstanding fell behind the limit sanctioned. This 
association is more pronounced since 1997 during which banks have increasingly moved 
towards financing housing demand. It can also be indicated at this stage, the Indian taxation 
laws also stimulated housing loan demands and banks got it as an additional opportunity to 
expand their credit portfolio at a reasonable rate.2 It is interesting to note that between the 
years 2003-05, the housing loan outstanding overshot limit sanctioned which indicates the 
incipient delinquency. This probably was the reason why RBI put a break on sharp growth in 
lending to specific segments which also includes Housing Loans. During times of expansion 
and accelerated credit growth, there is a tendency to under estimate the level of inherent risk 
and the converse holds during times of recession. This tendency is not effectively addressed 
by prudential specific provisioning requirements since they capture risk ex-post but not ex-
ante (Reddy, 2005). In the said policy (2005-06), RBI increased the provisioning requirement 
for standard advances from the existing level of 0.25 percent to 0.40 percent. In the annual 
                                                 
2
  Interest on borrowed capital up to a certain limit is allowed as deduction if capital is borrowed for the 
purpose of purchase, construction, repair, renewal or reconstruction of the house property under Section 24 (b) 
of the Indian Income Tax (IT) Act. In addition, the principal repayment of the loan/capital borrowed is eligible 
for rebate under Section 88C of the IT Act, 2005 
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policy statement for the year 2006-07, RBI increased the general provisioning requirement 
further to 1 percent (Reddy, 2006).  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Lending to the housing sector creates its own collateral in the form of the primary 
security. This has ramifications when cash transactions are involved, which is customarily 
necessarily paid by the borrower to the promoter and is not included in the actual purchase 
price while sanctioning housing loan by banks. This gives the lending institution a greater 
level of comfort as the borrower now has a higher implicit exposure to the property. While 
lending to home owners may be a more secure form of credit, for the reasons noted above, a 
rapid dispensation in such credit inevitably involves features that spell risk. Rapid expansion 
of the home-loan portfolio (a target-driven approach) by Indian Banks during the recent years 
might have had adverse effect on the lending disciplines in the form of relaxation in income 
criterion, scrutiny of the title documents etc. Defaults and foreclosures could increase with 
adverse consequences for bank profitability and even viability. 
Further, as evident from Figure 2, house price index in India moved in line with the 
economic cycle and this was more pronounced during 2004 onwards when banks stepped up 
the lending to housing segment. The sharp rise in house price after 2003 is mainly due to 
rapid growth in bank lending to this segment. The rise in housing prices within a short span 
of time may encourage speculation which in the long run may prove to be illusive to banks 
and HFCs. A close watch on the borrower’s leverage position in a rising interest rate 
environment is therefore a necessity. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
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Recognizing these risks, our paper empirically examines various idiosyncratic as well 
as situational factors that influence housing demand and risk profile of borrowers.  
 
4. Data, Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
The borrower specific parameters normally used by the HFCs and banks while 
granting loan and pricing of such loans include ownership pattern, gender, age, income, 
marital status, occupation, location, service & length of service, number of dependents, 
collateral information, guarantor etc. apart from property specific information. In all, a 
random sample of 13,487 borrower details is collected from residential housing loan files of 
a leading housing finance company (HFC) in India and three public sectors banks of the 
country (we are calling them together as HFIs). These loans were sanctioned any time 
between years 1993 to 2007. 
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics for the samples used to perform our 
various empirical tests are reported in Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8. Table 6 documents overall sample 
statistics. This fairly gives idea about the profile of the borrowers and their distribution. As 
one can notice, 74.14 percent of the borrowers live in Urban Area, 3.52 percent in Sub-urban 
area and 22.30 percent in rural location. As far as city-wide distributions of borrowers are 
concerned, 33.49 percent stay in big cities, 50.41 percent live in Medium sized cities and 
16.1 percent from smaller cities. Similarly, one may look at the employment status of the 
sample customers-90.40 percent of them are employed, 6.70 percent are self employed, 2.40 
percent are either unemployed or housewives and 0.50 percent belongs to retired & 
pensioners group. The average age of the borrowers is approximately 44 years with a 
standard deviation of 8.49. In terms of percentiles, 75 percentiles of the borrowers are in the 
age level of below 50 years, and 25 percent are below 35 years of age. The median age of the 
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borrowers is 44 years. If we look at the age slab wise distribution, 33.01 percent of the 
borrowers in the age range: below 40; 41.08 percent are in 40-50; 23.87 percent in 50-60 and 
2.02 percent belongs to the age group of above 60 years. Hence, one may summarize that: a 
typical home loan borrower would most likely to be a male in the age group of 40-50, 
although a significant 25 percent were below 35 years of age. This age group would prefer to 
buy a 700 sq ft (70 square meters) dwelling. 
[Insert Table 5 and Table 6 here] 
Table 7 depicts the falling trend in average age profile of the housing demand. A 
statistical un-paired t-test confirms that the year wise fall in average age is significant at 1 
percent or better level except between year 2006 and 2007.  
The profiles of defaulted and non defaulted (or solvent) borrowers are presented in 
Table 8. There is significant difference between the two classes of customers. Clearly, 
solvent group of customers are financially better (in terms of monthly income, asset value, 
property area etc.) than their defaulted counterparts. The defaulted borrowers significantly 
have larger number of dependents, lesser number of co-borrowers, and the security margin.  
[Insert Table 7 and Table 8 here] 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Household demand estimation-: studying the various demand factors  
We have considered natural log of house area (in square meter) as proxy for housing 
demand. To study the impact and demand elasticity with respect to various factors, we have 
performed a Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) regression model with various 
explanatory variables collected from the sample data of housing loan accounts from HFIs 
studied in this paper. 
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Table 9 reports the results of log-linear least squares dummy variable (LSDV) panel 
regression results (with robust standard errors) of inter relationship between various factors 
and housing demand. The borrower specific fixed effects are captured by 3 ‘property 
location’ dummies (Urban, Semi-urban and Rural) and 3 ‘regional’ dummies (with respect to 
city size). The location dummies are indicating the borrower location in either ‘Urban’ or 
‘Sub Urban’ or in ‘Rural’ area.  (See in Table 9, out of the three property location dummies, 
PROPLOCND1_ URBAN is being dropped and added with the intercept to avoid multi-
collinearity problem). Our results show that if other factors held constant, demand for house 
area (in square meter) is significantly higher in sub-urban and rural area than in urban areas. 
Similarly, citizens in smaller and medium cities have greater demand for bigger houses than 
population in big cities. This supports the view that locational factors have influence in 
driving housing demand.   
[Insert Table 9 here] 
One can see from the table 9 that income and price elasticity of demand is less than 
unity. This implies that with the increase in income of the borrower, demand for house would 
increase; it but would increase at a less than proportionate rate; same is true with price. It can 
therefore be concluded that housing demand is income and price sensitive. Since the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of area of property (LNAREA_HD -proxy the housing 
demand in terms of area), the regression coefficient of ‘LHOUSEPR_SQM’ (natural log 
value of house price per square meter of property) can be interpreted as the estimated 
percentage change in the house demand for a 100 percentage change in house price. Holding 
other factors constant, an increase in house price by 10 percent, ceteris paribus, results in a 
4.59 percent decrease in housing demand as affordability comes down. Similarly, the 
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coefficient of income variable (LN_MINC: natural log of monthly income) in Table 9 
captures the impact of income on housing demand. The estimated coefficient 0.599 captures 
that a10 percent increase in the monthly income of the borrower leads to increase in housing 
demand area by 5.99 percent.  
As far as the other factors are concerned, our results show that the demand for house-
size is found to be inversely related with the age of the borrowers, depicting that younger 
borrowers look for bigger house. Moreover, demand for housing space is also influenced by 
employment situation as retired and pensioners as well as self employed group demand 
bigger houses than employed and un-employed group.  
The number of dependents (NO_DEPEND) capture the financial liability of the 
borrower and the negatively significant coefficient implies that more number of dependents 
in a family reduces the affordability and hence the size of the house.  
5.2. Risk factors in housing loans: Key parameters driving House loan default 
In this section, we study various factors that can cause housing loan default. These 
factors were collected from the HFC’s loan history files. The borrower specific parameters 
normally used by the HFCs while granting loan and pricing of such loans include age, 
income, occupation, service and length of service, number of dependents, collateral 
information, guarantor etc. apart from property specific information. In a set of logistic 
regressions, we have compared the borrowers in standard category (54 percent of the total 
sample) with the defaulted counterparts (46 percent of the total sample).  
Logistic regression is a simple and appropriate technique for estimating the log of the 
odds of default as a linear function of loan application attributes: 
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A logistic model has the flexibility of incorporating both the qualitative and 
quantitative factors and is more efficient than the linear regression probability model. In a set 
of logistic regression exercises, we are actually predicting the probability of a housing loan 
default based on the financial, non financial (qualitative borrower characteristics), situational 
factors (location and local factors) obtained from the credit files and finally macro economic 
conditions using a panel data of 13,487 borrowers (46 percent defaulted and 54 percent 
solvent) for 15 years (1993-2007).  
The regression results reported in Table-10 provide evidence of major risk factors in 
housing loan. Logit model is a limited dependent maximum likelihood regression estimation 
model (similar to Amemiya, 1981; Maddala, 1983). Regression table (Table-10) is the 
outcome of a logistic regression on a dummy dependent variable “DDEF” that is equal to ‘1’ 
if the borrower is in the ‘defaulted category’ and is equal to ‘0’ if the borrower is ‘solvent’. 
We are actually predicting the odd ratio: Prob (Default/Solvency) on various quantitative 
factors (like area of plot, security value to loan value, number of co-borrowers etc.) and 
qualitative variables (like presence of a guarantor, marital status, employment status etc.). 
Estimated values of the parameters (or Coefficients reported in the 2nd column of table 10) 
can be used to describe the probability of a borrower to default for a unit change in these 
parameters. The estimated coefficients actually explain how the probability of default 
changes with one unit change in the parameters (independent variables).  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Table 10 results document that security value (represented by the variable: 
SECVAL_LOANAMT (or inverse of loan to value ratio or LTV, which is the ratio of 
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original book value of the property to the loan amount) is an important and significant 
determinant of default risk in housing loan (see the coefficient sign is negative and is 
significant at less than 5 percent level). This means, higher the security margin available to 
the bank (real margin in this case), lower is the chance of default in home loan. We have also 
computed economic significance of SECVAL_LOANAMT on the risk of default in housing 
loan.  The regression coefficient of real margin available or SECVAL_LOANAMT measures 
the influence of margin on default risk. It explains: A decrease (increase) in security value in 
proportion to loan amount (or inverse LTV) of 1 unit (or 100 percent), with all other 
variables held constant, increases (decreases) the odds of default by (0.845-1)×100=15.5 
percent (see Table 10).3 Or, we can say that with 10 percent decrease in security margin over 
loan amount, the odds of default increases by 1.55 percent.  
Interestingly, we observe that (Table 10) house size area (LNAREA_HD) is inversely 
associated with estimated likelihood of default. That is, Bigger the size of house (in terms of 
area in square meter), lower is the risk of default in housing loan.  
We have also tested the relationship between EMI to Income ratio (EMI_INCR) and 
default risk. The regression result depict that EMI_INCR is positively associated with the 
estimated likelihood of default. A 10 percent increase in EMI to Income ratio (EMI_INCR) is 
estimated to raise the likelihood of default by about 4.50 percent. Given the income level at 
the time of sanctioning of loan, any increase in financial burden due to other additional 
personal debt certainly increase probability of default. This result has great implications for 
the bank’s loan monitoring. In a rising interest rate environment, EMI to Income ratio may 
significantly increase which may raise the risk of default. To keep the EMI burden under 
                                                 
3
  The odds that the dependent variable takes the value 1 changes by a factor of exp (-0.169)-1=0.845-1=-
0.155 with 1 unit change in SECVAL_LOANAMT. 
 17 
check, banks in India normally extends the tenure of the loan to reduce the burden of the 
borrower. However, there is a limit to which the tenure may be increased to soften this 
impact. Banks and housing finance companies should therefore simultaneously monitor the 
movement of net credit exposure over time and its sensitivity with interest rate and house 
price movements as a mitigation tool against future risk of default. 
Default chance is also lower when banks or lending institutions see a higher 
additional collateral (ADCOLLD dummy=1 if additional collateral is present and 0 otherwise 
with |z|=2.48 which means level of significance is 5 percent or better in Table 10) and it is 
highly positively significant). The presence of more number of co-borrowers 
(NO_CO_BORR) also significantly reduces the risk of default (Table 10). More importantly, 
higher the co-borrower’s monthly income (COBOR_MINC), lesser is the chance of default 
because of availability of second line of source of income. It is interesting to note here that 
Indian banks & HFCs do prefer to include house-wife also as a co-borrower; this is with the 
view that a typical Indian house-wife would not like to default in housing loan, which is the 
dwelling house of the family. 
As age increases and the number of dependents increases, risk of default also rises. 
Age dummies capture the differential impact of age factor on loan default. Borrowers in the 
age range of 50-60 (AGED3) are riskier than the borrowers at age group below 40 (AGED1), 
age range of 40-50 (AGED2), and above 60 (AGED4). Borrowers in the age group of below 
40 (AGED1) are found to be the safest (comparing the coefficients).This may be explained 
by two factors: 
1) Aggressive selling of personal loans (2004 onwards) by banks might have resulted in 
over-stretching the capabilities of the individuals who might have already availed-of 
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housing loans in this group and jeopardized their ability to service EMIs of housing 
loans; Moreover, being already in the higher age bracket they probably had lesser 
number of service years left and the lender had limited maneuverability to adjust the 
EMI over the remaining years of service to soften the impact of strained financial 
position; 
2) Borrowers in the age group of below 40 years might have joined the loan stream in 
later years, and hence defaults in younger age group might show a better picture. 
We have found that sub-urban and rural borrowers are significantly riskier than the urban 
borrowers, and semi urban borrowers are riskier than rural borrowers. (See the property 
location dummy effects with respect to the dummy that has been dropped). This perhaps 
captures the local situational factors on risk of default.  To more accurately capture the effect 
locational factors on default risk, we have further re-grouped the 20 regional dummies into 3 
city-size-wise dummies (CITYD1_BIG: big cities, CITYD2_MEDIUM: medium sized cities 
and CITYD3_SMALL: small cities) and tested their impact on loan default (Table 10 
results).  We find that borrowers located in than medium (CITYD2_MED: Ahmedabad, 
Chandigarh, Coimbatore, Hyderabad, Indore, Lucknow, Nagpur, Nashik, Pune and 
Vadodara) and smaller cities (CITYD3_SMALL: Bhubaneshwar, Guwahati, Trivandrum, 
Jaipur and Kochi) are safer than in big cities (like Bangalore, Mumbai, Kolkata, New Delhi 
and Chennai (CITYD1_BIG). This may be because with the activation of personal loan 
segment by commercial banks and easy access to such loans especially in the metro area 
prompted the existing home loan borrowers to overstretch their financial commitments with a 
consequential deleterious effect on home loan default rate in this segment.    
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The effect of employment on housing default has also been examined (represented by 
employment dummies). We find that employment (EMPD1_EMPLOYED) has significantly 
negative impact on default risk. Self employed borrowers (EMPD2_SELF_EMPLOYED) are 
quite risky probably due to absence of steady stream of income like the employed class.   
5.3. Important determinants of housing loan recovery 
Next, we have examined the contribution of various factors in housing loan recovery. 
For this, we have run a Tobit censored multivariate regression on loan recovery rate (RR) to 
investigate the various determinants of recovery. The loan recovery rate is the ratio of total 
recovery of the defaulted loan till the financial year 2006-07 divided by the amount 
outstanding at the date of default (EAD). We have used panel tobit regression method to 
ascertain the various factors (borrower/loan specific and other industry or economic /regional 
factors) play role in determining the probability that how much of the loan outstanding the 
bank will be able to recover from the defaulted amount. Censoring (at 0 level) the dependent 
variable is required to control the possibility of 0 or negative recovery which may bias the 
prediction (if not considered). Here, our objective was not only to predict whether there will 
be recovery or not but also to ascertain how much will be recovered from the defaulted 
outstanding (or call it exposure at default or EAD). A tobit exercise which performs 
maximum likelihood technique (MLE) provide more efficient and unbiased estimate than 
OLS.4  
Our regression results reported in the Table 11 reveals some interesting facts. We 
have seen value of property or house as proportion to the original loan amount 
(SECVAL_LOANAMT) significantly and positively affects recovery. It means higher is the 
actual margin (calculated by bank) that the borrower is giving, better is the likelihood of 
                                                 
4
  See Greene, W. (1997). Econometric Analysis, 3rd Edition, Prentice Hall. 
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recovery on the loan. This confirms the importance of collateral valuation and factoring loan 
to value ratio (LTV) into risk analysis by the bank. A 10 percent increase in the ratio 
(secval_loanamt) lead to 0.21 percent increase in the recovery rate (RR). Moreover, due to 
the presence of guarantee, bank’s likelihood of recovery is more (confirmed by the positive 
significance of GURANTD).  
Higher loan to income ratio (LOAN_INCR) is the reflection of borrower’s riskiness 
which has dampening impact on recovery prospect of the defaulted loan (confirmed by the 
significantly negative coefficient). In a separate regression, we have also tested affordability 
variable5 on recovery rate and found that this ratio has also significantly negative impact on 
RR (results not reported in Table 11). It means that if property becomes un-affordable 
because of higher gap between its average value and borrower’s average income, recovery 
chance from defaulted loans also suffer. Similarly, our regression results show that higher 
number of dependents significantly reduces the scope of recovery (negative sign of 
NO_DEPEND) due to higher financial burdens which is quite expected.  
[Insert Table 11 here] 
Interestingly, Age of the borrower is positively significant on recovery rate on the 
loan. The recovery rate is highest in the age slab of more than 60 groups. We have also found 
that housing loan recovery rate in urban and rural area is significantly higher than in the sub-
urban area. The regional variations in recovery rates are being captured by city-wise regional 
location dummies. Medium and Smaller cities have higher recovery rates than the Big cities. 
Interestingly, recovery from retired & pensioners and self employed groups are significantly 
better than employed, self employed, unemployed and retired borrower counterparts.   
                                                 
5
  It is the ratio of book value of the property to gross annual income.  We assume higher the ratio, lesser 
is the affordability of the borrower from its internal source of income and higher is the leverage factor. 
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6. Summary and Concluding Discussions 
The primary contribution of the research delineated in this paper is to demonstrate the 
importance of borrower specific characteristics in determining the demand prospect as well 
as the risk of credit loss on residential housing loan repayment.  Growing competition and 
reduction in regulatory risk weights on housing loans has provided a substantial incentive to 
the lending institutions in India resulting in aggressive practices including very high Loan to 
Value (LTV) loans, softening of collateral requirements, competitive pricing etc. However, 
we have learnt from the recent US mortgage crisis that many lenders, especially sub-prime 
lenders has been caught into the web of “boom time facile lending practices” of over-
generosity to several borrowers with unpalatable credit histories and very low margin. This 
has led to current unforeseen and negative consequences of homeowners’ inability to sustain 
mortgage payments resulting in numerous foreclosures and credit defaults. Understanding the 
interplay between various factors driving housing sector demand and their link with borrower 
default will no doubt help the policy planners, regulators and lenders.  
Using 13,487 housing loan accounts (sanctioned from 1993-2007) data  from Housing 
Finance Institutions (HFIs) in India we investigate the crucial factors that drive household 
demand for housing and the correlation of borrower characteristics with housing demand 
have been presented. We have observed that housing demand growth in India is mainly 
driven by accessibility and credit availability, changing income level, increasing GDP growth 
rate, changing family pattern and age demographic effect. An increase in house price by 10 
percent, ceteris paribus, results in a 4.59 percent decrease in housing demand (in terms of 
floor area) as affordability comes down. A 10 percent increase in the monthly income of the 
borrower leads to increase in housing demand area by almost 6 percent. 
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Further, the demand for house-size is found to be inversely related with the age of the 
borrowers. The number of dependence, which capture the financial liability of the borrower, 
is found to have negatively significant implying thereby more the number of dependents in a 
family reduces the affordability and hence the size of the house. The study notes that demand 
for bigger house area (in square meter) is significantly higher in sub-urban and rural area 
than in urban areas. Citizens in smaller (tier III) and medium sized (tier II) cities have greater 
demand for bigger houses than population in big cities (metros). 
Next, we examine housing loan defaults and the major causative factors. Our 
empirical results suggest that borrower defaults on housing loan payments is mainly driven 
by change in market value of the property vis-à-vis the loan amount and EMI to income ratio. 
A 10 percent decrease in the market value of the property vis-à-vis the loan amount raises the 
odds of default by 1.55 percent. Similarly, a 10 percent increase in EMI to income ratio 
raises the delinquency chance by 4.50 percent.  This essentially means that volatility of 
potential credit exposure needs to be properly understood (especially in a rising rate 
environment and unstable market condition). We have empirically observed the influence of 
systematic factor on loan default rates: an increase in GDP growth rate significantly reduces 
the likelihood of default. 
Ignoring borrower details like marital status, employment situation, regional 
locations, city locations, age profile, house are preference may inhibit the lender to properly 
assess the credit risk in home loan business, as our study suggests, these parameters also act 
as default triggers. We found that default is lower in cases where the house is larger in size, 
the monthly income is higher, asset value is higher and age of the borrower is lower. The 
presence of more number of co-borrowers and their income level significantly reduces the 
 23 
risk of default. It has been found that sub-urban and rural borrowers are significantly riskier 
than the urban borrowers, and semi urban borrowers are riskier than rural borrowers. 
However, metro dwellers are riskier than those living in Tier II and III towns. This could be 
because people living in metros have access to easy loans from commercial banks, leading to 
the borrower being over stretched. Employment has significantly risk reduction effect; we 
find higher default percentage in self employed people. 
We have also studied the key factors driving the recovery prospect in the housing 
loan segment. Our Tobit censored multivariate regression results suggests that higher is the 
actual margin better is the likelihood of recovery on the loan. This confirms the importance 
of collateral valuation and factoring loan to value ratio (LTV) into risk analysis by the bank. 
Presence of guarantee is found [to found] to improve bank’s likelihood of recovery. A 10 
percent increase in the ratio (SECVAL_LOANAMT) lead to 0.21 percent increase in the 
recovery rate (RR). However, higher number of dependents significantly reduces the scope of 
recovery. We have found that housing loan recovery rate in urban and rural area is 
significantly higher than in the sub-urban area. Medium and Smaller cities have higher 
recovery rates than the Big cities. Interestingly, recovery from retired & pensioners and self 
employed groups are significantly better than employed, self employed, unemployed and 
retired borrower counterparts.   
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Table 1 
Housing Finance Disbursement  by various Institutions 
(Units in Rs. Crore) 
 
Institutions 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 
All Scheduled Commercial 
Banks (PSBs) 25412.41 32825.92 49066.92 85346.45 126797.03 182167.2 230689 
Housing Finance Companies 
(HFCs) 12638 14614.44 17832.01 20862.23 26000 29500 32500 
Total 38050.41 47440.36 66898.93 106208.7 152797.03 211667.2 263189 
% Share of HFCs 33.21% 30.81% 26.66% 19.64% 17.02% 13.94% 12.35% 
Total YoY Growth (%) 29% 22% 34% 46% 36% 33% 22% 
 
Source: Basic Statistical Returns of RBI & various NHB Reports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: 
Deployment of Gross Bank Credit in Real Estate and Housing Segment 
(Rs. Crore) 
Outstanding as On 
March 
23, 2001 
March 
22, 2002 
March 
21, 2003 
March 
19, 2004 
March 
18, 2005 
March 
31, 2006 
March 
30, 2007 
Gross Bank Credit 469153 536727 669534 764383 972587 1443920 1841878 
Food Credit 3991 53978 49479 35961 41121 40691 46521 
Non-Food Gross Bank 
Credit (1 to 4) 429162 482749 620055 728422 931466 1403229 1795357 
Real Estate Loans 1766 2596 5894 5577 10612 26693 45328 
Share in total non-food 
bank credit (%) 0.41% 0.54% 0.95% 0.77% 1.14% 1.90% 2.52% 
Housing Loans 16143 22346 36587 51981 75173 185181 230689 
Share in total non-food 
bank credit (%) 3.76% 4.63% 5.90% 7.14% 8.07% 13.20% 12.85% 
Incremental Share  20.8% 24.2% 19.1% 12.2% 49.2% -2.7% 
Note: Gross Bank Credit=Food Credit+Non food credit 
Source: RBI Trends and Progress 
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Table 3: Projection of housing demand through credit supply 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Year 
 
No. of 
Loans 
disbursed 
by PSBs 
Share 
of 
HFCs 
No. of 
Loans 
disbursed 
by HFCs 
Total 
no. of 
Housing 
Loans 
Households  
Number  
(million) 
Loan 
No./HH 
no. 
1994-95 819856 40% 327942 1147798 167.84 0.68% 
1995-96 1033802 40% 413521 1447323 171.14 0.85% 
1996-97 1080164 40% 432066 1512230 174.51 0.87% 
1997-98 1275149 40% 510060 1785209 177.95 1.00% 
1998-99 2253390 41% 923890 3177280 181.46 1.75% 
1999-00 2482797 37% 918635 3401432 185.04 1.84% 
2000-01 1816315 25% 454079 2270394 188.70 1.20% 
2001-02 2446081 30% 733824 3179905 191.96 1.66% 
2002-03 3035026 23% 698056 3733082 197.09 1.89% 
2003-04 3326452 19% 632026 3958478 202.00 1.96% 
2004-05 3666450 15% 549968 4216418 207.07 2.04% 
2005-06 4521531 12% 542584 5064115 212.31 2.39% 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Potential Demand For Housing: Projected Scenarios 
Year 
 
Loan Growth @ 
2.35% 
Loan Growth @ 2.50% Loan Growth @ 3.30% 
2006-07 5.12 5.44 6.53 
2007-08 5.25 5.58 6.70 
2008-09 5.38 5.73 6.87 
2009-10 5.52 5.88 7.05 
2010-11 5.67 6.03 7.23 
2011-12 5.82 6.19 7.43 
The above figures are in million units 
Loan growth rate (%): Number of housing loan/Households number 
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Figure1: The link between Housing Loan Growth and GDP Growth 
 
Housing Loan Gr. Vs. GDP Growth
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Figure 2: House Price Movement with Economic Growth & House Loan Growth 
 
House Price Index Vs. GDP Gr & Housng Loan Gr
0.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
300.00
350.00
400.00
19
96
-
97
19
97
-
98
19
98
-
99
19
99
-
00
20
00
-
01
20
01
-
02
20
02
-
03
20
03
-
04
20
04
-
05
20
05
-
06
20
06
-
07
Year
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
HPI
GDP Gr
Housing
Loan Gr
 
 
 
Note: The house price index is computed on the basis of housing loan data of a leading HFC 
using Laspeyres index by taking 1997 as the base (=100). The house price is the property 
price per square meter. The weights are the property area in terms of square meter.  The 
bank’s housing loan growth (annual) is computed based on the data obtained from BSR 
statistics. 
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Table 5: 
Variable definitions 
Variable 
 
Definition 
 
LNAREA_HD Natural log of area of House (in square meter) : Dependent 
variable measures housing demand in section III.2 exercise 
DDEF Dummy (0/1) variable=1 if account is NPA and 0 if 
account is in standard category: Dependent variable in 
section III.3 exercise 
RR Recovery rate is calculated as the total amounts recovered 
till 2006-07 in comparison with the outstanding amount on 
the date of default: Dependent variable in section III.4 
exercise 
LN_MINC Natural log of monthly income of the borrowers 
[=ln(monthly income)] 
LHOUSEPR_SQM Natural log of house price per square meter [=ln(book 
value of property/property area in square meter] 
NO_DEPEND 
 
Number of dependents in the borrower’s family 
PROPLOCND1_URBAN,  
PROPLOCND2_SUB-URBAN and 
PROPLOCND3_RURAL 
Three property location dummies (0/1) variable (represent 
location of the property) =1 if the borrower is located 
either in Urban/Sub-urban/Rural, otherwise 0.  
SECVAL_LOANAMT The ratio of Original book value of the property at the time 
of sanction  (or property cost) over original loan amount 
capture the original security margin available for the loan 
GURANTD  Dummy (0/1) variable=1 if third party guarantee is present 
ADCOLLD Dummy (0/1) variable =1 if additional collateral is present 
and =0 otherwise 
NO_CO_BORR 
 
Number of co-borrowers present 
COBOR_MINC 
 
Co-borrower’s  monthly income 
EMPD1_EMPLOYED,  
EMPD2_SELF-EMPLOYED,  
EMPD3_Unemployed & HOUSE 
WIVES and 
EMPD4_RETIRED_&_PENSIONER 
Set of four employment dummy(0/1) variable  depending 
upon employment types 
GDPGR  
 
GDP growth rate during the year of loan sanction 
ORGNL_TERMM  
 
Original tenure of the loan (in months) 
AGE_BORR Age of the borrower 
AGED1_<40, AGED2_40-50,  
AGED3_50-60 and 
AGED4_>60 
Set of four dummy (0/1) variable  classifying 
borrowers/individuals by respective age groups 
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SURVIVAL_DAYS 
 
Number of days of survival of loan from the origination 
day. For defaulted loan: days between granting of loan and 
default. For good loans or standard accounts, days between 
granting and latest reporting year (31st March, 2007 
CITYD1_BIG Dummy (0/1) variable =1 if borrower is located in big 
cities like Bangalore, Mumbai, Kolkata, New Delhi and 
Chennai and =0 otherwise 
CITYD2_MEDIUM 
 
Dummy (0/1) variable =1 if borrower is located in medium 
sized cities like Ahmedabad, Chandigarh, Coimbatore, 
Hyderabad, Indore, Lucknow, Nagpur, Nashik, Pune and 
Vadodara and =0 otherwise 
CITYD3_SMALL Dummy (0/1) variable =1 if borrower is located in medium 
sized cities like Bhubaneshwar, Guwahati, Trivandrum, 
Jaipur and Kochi and =0 otherwise 
LOAN_INCR  
 
Loan amount to gross annual income ratio of the borrower 
EMI_INCR 
 
EMI to Monthly income ratio of the borrower 
LN_ASSTVAL 
 
Natural log of asset value of the borrower 
 
 
Table 6: 
Overall Sample descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean S.D Median 25% 75% Kurtosis 
GROSS MONTHLY INCOME (RS.) 
(‘000) 
15.54 22.38 9.84 7.088 15.487 133.89 
PROPERTY AREA (SQ. METER) 85.36 88.47 70 50 100 579.50 
AGE_BORR 43.59 8.34 44 38 50 2.616 
NO_DEPEND 1.58 1.38 2 0 3 0.535 
PROPLOCND1_URBAN 0.7414 0.44 1 0 1 2.22 
PROPLOCND2_SUB-URBAN 0.0352 0.184 0 0 0 26.44 
PROPLOCND3_RURAL 0.223 0.42 0 0 0 2.76 
CITYD1_BIG 0.3349 0.472 0 0 1 1.49 
CITYD2_MEDIUM 0.5041 0.50 1 0 1 1 
CITYD3_SMALL 0.161 0.367 0 0 0 4.41 
EMPD1_EMPLOYED 0.9040 0.294 1 1 1 8.59 
EMPD2_SELF-EMPLOYED 0.067 0.25 0 0 0 13.03 
EMPD3_Unemployed & HOUSE 
WIVES 
0.024 0.152 0 0 0 40.41 
EMPD4_RETIRED_&_PENSIONER 0.005 0.07 0 0 0 199.17 
AGED1_<40 0.3301 0.47 0 0 1 1.52 
AGED2_40-50 0.4108 0.49 0 0 1 1.13 
AGED3_50-60 0.2387 0.426 0 0 0 2.50 
AGED4_>60 0.0202 0.141 0 0 0 47.42 
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Table 7: 
 
Year-wise Age Pattern of House Loan Demand 
 
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Year T statistics for 
difference 
1177 46.28 7.26 2000  
1417 45.55 7.48 2001 -2.52** 
1968 44.75 7.60 2002 -3.04** 
1578 44.08 7.70 2003 -2.61** 
1707 42.93 7.90 2004 -4.22** 
1165 41.70 7.90 2005 -4.09** 
1912 38.73 8.36 2006 -9.74** 
732 38.49 9.16 2007 -0.64 
Note: ** denotes significance at 5% or better level 
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Table 8: 
 
Comparison between Solvent and Defaulted Home Loan Borrowers 
Variable Name 
 
Mean Std. Dev. 
 Solvent Defaulted t-test for  
Difference$ 
Solvent Defaulted 
PROPERTY AREA (SQ. 
METER) 
101.67 65.99 35.68** 
(23.81) 
114.89 27.50 
LNAREA_HD 4.42 4.10 0.317** 
(35.82) 
0.578 0.421 
GROSS MONTHLY 
INCOME (RS.) 
20,443.30 9,711.90 10,731.40** 
(28.56) 
28891.63 6501.132 
LN_MINC 9.55 9.06 0.484** 
(43.56) 
0.768 0.449 
LHOUSEPR_SQM 8.92 8.68 0.2458** 
(23.52) 
0.692 0.481 
AGE_BORR 42.79 44.58 -1.79** 
(-12.42) 
8.84 7.70 
NO_DEPEND 1.445 1.744 -0.2988** 
(-12.57) 
1.343 1.411 
LN_ASSTVAL 12.75 11.95 0.798** 
(22.15) 
1.452 1.271 
SECVAL_LOANAMT 1.65 1.499 0.15** 
(10.05) 
0.987 0.69 
NO_CO_BORR 0.48 0.31 0.174** 
(18.70) 
0.57 0.50 
COBOR_MINC 3061.04 1024.64 2036.4** 
(12.30) 
12715.4 2940.8 
ORGNL_TERMM 173.26 176.4 -3.14** 
(-3.8) 
48.03 47.60 
SURVIVAL_DAYS 1367.34 204.21 1163.13** 
(44.73) 
2030.78 223.77 
No. of observations 
 
7321 6166    
Note:  
$ Outcome of an un-paired t-test for the difference in mean 
Figures in the parentheses are the t values 
** denotes significance at 5% or better 
 
It is important to note that we have found average survival period for defaulted loans is 
approximately 204 days 
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Table 9 
The determinants of Housing Demand: Panel least square dummy variable regression 
with robust standard errors on natural logarithm of house area (dependent variable: 
LNAREA_HD ) 
Independent variables 
 
Coefficient 
estimate 
T-statistic 
LN_MINC 0.599 61.57** 
LHOUSEPR_SQM -0.459 -33.52** 
NO_DEPEND -0.015 -5.87** 
PROPLOCND1_URBAN dropped  
PROPLOCND2_SUB-URBAN 0.107 5.67** 
PROPLOCND3_RURAL 0.02 2.32** 
CITYD1_BIG dropped  
CITYD2_MEDIUM 0.018 2.02* 
CITYD3_SMALL 0.240 18.63** 
AGED1_<40 0.067 6.56** 
AGED2_40-50 0.048 5.23** 
AGED3_50-60 dropped  
AGED4_>60 0.069 2.04** 
EMPD1_EMPLOYED -0.162 -2.42** 
EMPD2_SELF-EMPLOYED 0.171 2.46** 
EMPD3_Unemployed & HOUSE WIVES -0.120 -1.69* 
EMPD4_RETIRED_&_PENSIONER dropped  
INTERCEPT 3.142 31.38** 
   
Number of observations 12423  
Model R2 0.465  
Note: 
** Significant at 5% or better 
* Significant at 5-10%. 
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Table 10 
Factors determine housing loan default: Logit regression results (dependent variable: 
DDEF) 
Independent variables 
 
Coefficient 
estimate 
Z-statistic 
LNAREA_HD -0.982 -21.64** 
EMI_INCR 0.371 2.69** 
SECVAL_LOANAMT -0.169 -5.64** 
GDPGR -13.879 -12.86** 
NO_DEPEND 0.058 3.89** 
ADCOLLD -0.145 -2.48** 
NO_CO_BORR -0.244 -5.67** 
COBOR_MINC 0.000 -7.74** 
ORGNL_TERMM 0.007 12.21** 
PROPLOCND1_URBAN dropped  
PROPLOCND2_SUB-URBAN 0.622 5.80** 
PROPLOCND3_RURAL 0.579 11.71** 
CITYD1_BIG dropped  
CITYD2_MEDIUM -0.136 -3.06** 
CITYD3_SMALL -0.534 -7.99** 
AGED1_<40 -0.866 -13.02** 
AGED2_40-50 -0.429 -7.53** 
AGED3_50-60 dropped  
AGED4_>60 -0.228 -1.47 
EMPD1_EMPLOYED -0.362 -2.71** 
EMPD2_SELF-EMPLOYED 0.495 3.18** 
EMPD3_Unemployed & HOUSE WIVES dropped  
EMPD4_RETIRED_&_PENSIONER -0.228 -1.47 
   
INTERCEPT 5.395 21.71** 
   
Number of observations 12407  
LR Chi2 statistic (degrees of freedom) 2185.75 (19)  
Prob>Chi2 0.00  
Pseudo R2 0.13  
Note: 
The dummies are dropped due to collinearity 
** Significant at 5% or better 
* Significant at 5-10%. 
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Table 11 
Factors determine housing loan recovery rate: Tobit regression results (dependent 
variable: RR) 
Independent variables 
 
Coefficient 
estimate 
T-statistic 
LOAN_INCR -0.046 -20.66** 
SECVAL_LOANAMT 0.021 5.87** 
NO_DEPEND 0.004 2.2** 
GURANTD 0.053 9.7** 
PROPLOCND1_URBAN 0.046 3.90** 
PROPLOCND2_SUB-URBAN dropped  
PROPLOCND3_RURAL 0.063 5.16** 
CITYD1_BIG dropped  
CITYD2_MEDIUM 0.037 7.27** 
CITYD3_SMALL 0.027 3.04** 
AGED1_<40 -0.141 -21.4** 
AGED2_40-50 -0.130 -22.42** 
AGED3_50-60 dropped  
AGED4_>60 0.256 13.25** 
EMPD2_SELF-EMPLOYED 0.053 5.83** 
EMPD4_RETIRED_&_PENSIONER 0.077 1.85* 
INTERCEPT 0.337 27.19** 
   
Number of observations 5856  
LR Chi2 statistic (degrees of freedom) 2019.88 (13)  
Prob>Chi2 0.00  
Pseudo R2 0.101  
Note: 
The dependent variable is amount recovered to total loan outstanding at the time of default 
and is left censored at zero.  
The dummies are dropped due to collinearity 
 
** Significant at 5% or better 
* Significant at 5-10%. 
 
